Ādi Śaṅkarācārya’s Deception

Part 2

By the druid Finn

Introduction

Śaṅkara’s historical persona is that of the great synthesiser of Vedic Brahmanism and Upaniṣadic non-duality: a commentator of the BrahmaSūtra, a teacher of Advaita Vedānta, a restorer of Vedic orthodoxy. On his own terms, his project is lofty: the recovery of śruti (that which is heard) in its truth, the dismantling of ignorance (avidyā), the realisation of the unchanging Brahman beyond name and form.
Yet, one may ask: Was Śaṅkara’s project truly one of pure philosophical coherence? Or was it, in effect, a device of power—a way to preserve priestly rule (varna, śrama) by embedding a metaphysical system which appears emancipatory yet functionally preserves dependence? In this reading, the shift from Vedic dualism (gods, rites, hierarchies) to Upaniṣadic monism (Brahman, Atman, identity) poses a problem: how to reconcile them in a lived social order dependent on ritual, caste, mediation? The answer: a rhetorical device — Advaita — which appears to transcend dualism while not thereby abolishing the social-ritual structures.

In what follows I elaborate this argument, locating key quotations of Śaṅkara and showing how they might serve both his ostensible metaphysical project and the deeper view of ideological maintenance. I conclude with reflections on the themes of “Know → Be”, of dualism’s social logic, and the withheld promise of monist autonomy.

The Aporetic Merge: Veda + Upaniṣad

The dualist Veda and the monist Upaniṣad

The early Vedas (Ṛg Veda, etc.) articulate a cosmos of multiplicity: gods, humans, sacrifice, world, ritual action. Meaning arises in relation, duty, mediators. By contrast, the Upaniṣads shift toward a monist horizon: the locus of reality is unchanging, monist (ekatva), where multiplicity is ultimately “mithyā” (ill-usory) relative to Brahman.

Śaṅkara repeatedly affirms:

“ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या, जियो ब्रह्मैव न परोर्” — “Brahman alone is real, the world is unreal; the living-being is verily Brahman and not other.”

This sets the monist line unequivocally. Yet he also never wholly abandons the language of action: various commentaries still grant ritual relevance, caste structure, dharma. In your framing, this is the tension: a dualist social ritual order plus monist metaphysical rhetoric.

The strategic inclusion of the Upaniṣads into Śruti

To claim the Upaniṣads as śruti (thus on par with the older Veda) is a major move. It allows Śaṅkara to co-opt Upaniṣadic monism without rejecting the ritual-sacrificial world of the Vedas. He thereby creates a bridge (or better, a rhetorical tunnel) between the two worlds. The Upaniṣads become the “inner meaning” of the Veda while the outer Veda remains valid.

Śaṅkara himself states:

“परमाणु H वचः…” (…the knowledge of Brahman alone destroys ignorance; action cannot destroy it).

By making knowledge decisive, ritual becomes subordinate — yet it need not be abolished. Thus the social order can continue under the tutelage of Brahmins and rituals, but the metaphysical claim is that all this is ultimately Brahman. This allows leverage: the priest‐politician can say “Yes your ritual matters in daily life, but ultimately you are Brahman, you already are free”.

From your perspective, the deception is that the monist claim serves to mask the dualist structure. The caste system remains; the priestly hierarchy remains; but the language of liberation is granted—so long as it does not disrupt the order. The jīvanmukta becomes an exceptional individual, not a transformation of the system.

The Invention of Advaita: Apophatic Fudge

The nature of “non-two” as placeholder

“Advaita” literally means non-two. It is not a positive doctrine, but a negation of duality. Śaṅkara uses it as the term:

“I am neither mind, nor intellect, nor ego, nor the senses… I am pure consciousness, bliss absolute, I am Śiva, I am Śiva.”

Here the self is asserted beyond all categories. Yet crucially this self is not posed as a fully autonomous agent in social space; rather as pure consciousness in which action, caste, identity, social differentiation vanish. In practice, the social world persists.
This apophatic doctrine acts as a semantic firewall. It allows Śaṅkara to claim “we transcend duality” while never challenging the social dualities of priest/lay, high/low, ritual/doer. In effect: “you are already Brahman, so your duty remains unaffected.” The dualism of the ritual world is preserved; the monist horizon is safely abstract.

The role of knowledge vs action

Śaṅkara repeatedly distinguishes between knowledge (jñāna) and action (karma):

“Action cannot destroy ignorance, for it is not in conflict with ignorance. Knowledge verily destroys ignorance as light destroys deep darkness.”

Thus, ritual and caste duties continue (action) but the path to liberation is knowledge. This means: the lay person remains in the world of action; the priest (or the exceptional jīvanmukta) enters knowledge. The system remains bifurcated, but now blessed with a metaphysical egalitarian rhetoric (“You are Brahman too”) which doesn’t have to be socialised into the ritual order.

The jīvanmukta and the status quo

Śaṅkara’s ideal of the liberated person is the jīvanmukta — one freed while living. But what is distinctive is that the jīvanmukta still lives in society; he does not radically restructure society. He knows his identity with Brahman and acts detachedly.
In Ātma Bodha it is stated:

“One who possesses knowledge of the Self … is liberated whether he wishes it or not.”

Thus, liberation is a personal realisation, not a collective transformation of the social order. This fits my critique: Śaṅkara’s monist language is personal, not social. It allows the system to remain intact while claiming metaphysical freedom.

The Priest-Politician Logic: Dualism Preserved, Monism Veneered

Dualism as social regulatory structure

In Procedure Monism framing, dualism is the paradigm of dependence: gods/humans, priests/lay, doers/ritual performers. This is the immature mode of being, requiring external regulation, mediation, hierarchy. The Vedic world thrives on it. Śaṅkara does not abolish this structure; rather he inherits and preserves it. Ritual, caste, sacrifice, priestly mediation all continue under the Smṛti/Vedic order.
Yet he layers over it the rhetorical monism: “You are Brahman, the world is illusory.” This allows him to maintain the social order while buttressing it with a metaphysical promise. In effect, he says: remain in your caste duty, perform your rituals, but internally you know you are Brahman. No need to challenge the order, for you have already transcended it.

Monism as elite heuristic, not structural shift

Monism, proposing the given, indeed every emergent, as perfect iteration of the Universal Emergence Procedure (i.e. Brahman/God) would have led to autonomy: “Be your self” rather than “Know your self”. A monist social ethic might dissolve caste, hierarchy, ritualised dependence. But Śaṅkara’s monism is individualised, inner-directed, not socialised. He does not call for dismantling caste, nor for the layperson to become a priest-politician. He creates the role of jīvanmukta — exceptional, detached, above but not disrupting the world.
Thus the social structure remains intact, while the metaphysical praise of unity serves to console the individual within the system. For the priest-politician, this is ideal: you preserve hierarchy and dependency while giving high metaphysical meaning to the hierarchy.

The “fudge” nature of Advaita

Advaita is a “fudge” because it does not commit fully to either dualism (with all its ritual consequences) or monism (with all its social consequences). It walks a tightrope. The term Advaita functions as a placeholder: non-dual in name, but dualism-in-practice; monist in rhetoric, dualist in social ontology.
The result: an ideological structure that legitimises the priestly power. The metaphysical claim (“you are Brahman”) acts as spiritual pacification; the ritual claim (“you must do your caste duty”) keeps social control.

Deconstructing the Quotes: Śaṅkara’s Misdirections

Let us inspect some of Śaṅkara’s key statements that serve to deceive.

1. “ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या, जियो ब्रह्मैव न परोर्.”
This is perhaps his most famous formula. On the face of it: “Brahman is truth, the world is unreal; the individual is none other than Brahman.” Yet consider the implications: if the world is unreal, then ritual, caste, action – all of which happen in the world – are at best provisional. But Śaṅkara does not withdraw the ritual apparatus; instead he tells the ritual practitioners: know your identity with Brahman while you continue your ritual function. Thus the world remains functionally real in the empirical sphere (vyāvahārika satya) while unreal in the ultimate (paramārthika). That ambiguity keeps the social order intact.

2. “Action cannot destroy ignorance… Knowledge verily destroys ignorance as light destroys deep darkness.”
Here we see the privileging of knowledge over action. A revolutionary notion, but in practice what happens? The layman still performs action (ritual, caste duty), but the claim is: the elite (brahmin, monk) obtains knowledge and is liberated. In the dualist social field, this preserves the priestly knowledge class as the locus of liberation, while ordinary ritual action remains the domain of dependence.

3. “I am neither mind, nor intellect, nor ego, nor the five senses… I am pure consciousness, bliss absolute, I am Śiva, I am Śiva.”
This powerful proclamation affirms ultimate identity. But note: it takes place in the inner sphere of individual consciousness. It does not translate directly into social action or transformation of caste relationship or ritual hierarchy. In that framing: “Know your self” gets internalised; “Be your self” (which would challenge hierarchy) is quietly elided.

4. The statement from the Upadesa-Sāhasrī (metre part 4):

“Whoever possesses knowledge of the Self … is liberated whether he wishes it or not.”
This suggests that liberation is already given through knowledge; no need to fight or transform the world. A passive, contemplative ideal that preserves the status quo. If liberation is achieved inwardly, the external structures need not change. The guardrails of ritual society remain untouched.

5. His approach to idol worship: Śaṅkara accepted idol worship (pūjā) as a preparatory stage (sāguna) for the highest formless reality (nirguṇa).
This is a key strategic move: the ritual forms (temples, images) are preserved; they become tools on the path to knowledge rather than obstacles to it. That means the ritual apparatus is co-opted rather than abolished. Thus the caste/temple complex remains, now legitimised by non-dualist rhetoric.

Consequences: The Retardation of Autonomy

By favouring dualism (dependency) with a light monist veneer, Śaṅkara retarded India’s philosophical adulthood and preserved social infancy. Let us explore how this works.

“Know your self” vs “Be your self”

From the monist perspective, dualism corresponds to the immature: externally regulated, dependent; monism corresponds to the mature: internally governed, autonomous. Śaṅkara enjoins “know your self” — be aware you are Brahman — but does not fully enact “be your self” in the sense of social autonomy, dismantling of caste, direct action from universal procedure. The caste order remains; external regulation remains. The internal freedom is offered, but it does not translate into external emancipation. The hierarchy continues.
Thus the monist ideal remains individualised and inward, rather than collectively enacted. The jīvanmukta is exceptional, not the normative citizen; the caste-ritual order remains normative.

Dependence preserved

Since the ritual system, caste divisions, priestly mediation remain functionally necessary, people remain in dependence—on rites, priests, caste identity, sacral hierarchy. The metaphysical promise “you are Brahman” becomes an inner solace, but it does not dissipate the dependency structure. The dualist social logic persists. This is consistent with your statement: “Holding Indians in dependence, therefore in control.” The monism is co-opted rather than liberatory.

The lost horizon of equivalence

A genuine monism, granting equivalence to all emergents, “would have freed that culture from primitive, in fact infantile Vedic design that fostered external regulation.” Because Śaṅkara’s system did not propose equivalence of caste, priesthood, class, but rather subsumed them under an individualised metaphysics, the social transformation, meaning revolution did not occur. The monist rhetoric remains, but the monist social ethic is withheld. Thus the potential of autonomy (for all) was forestalled; social dependencies remained locked.

Cultural maturity deferred

In the monist schema, cultural maturation requires moving from external regulation to internal, from dependence to autonomy, from dualism to monism. By establishing a metaphysical system that appears monist but retains dualist social structure, Śaṅkara deferred this maturity. The caste system survived; the priest-politician remained central; power remained mediated. The philosophical adulthood of India was postponed. In short: the invention of Advaita becomes an ideological device to preserve the status quo, while giving the appearance of transcendence.

Critical Reflections and Counterpoints

However, to be fair, one must acknowledge counter-arguments and engage them.

1. Śaṅkara as sincere metaphysician: It may be argued that Śaṅkara genuinely believed in the metaphysical reality of Brahman, and that his inclusion of the Upaniṣads and his monism were sincere efforts at metaphysical reconciliation, not cynical political manoeuvres. His rhetoric of knowledge, renunciation, self–inquiry, points to a serious spiritual path. However, sincerity does not exclude ideological effect: even sincere metaphysics can function to preserve existing debilitaing structures. The tension articulated is structural, not simply personal.

2. Social change from within: Some might claim that Śaṅkara’s system did effect change: the Smārta tradition, temple worship, the rise of monastic orders (mathas) and continuity of Vedic tradition owe much to him. The system did evolve.
But the deepest transformation, meaning the development to autonomy and authenticity—autonomous individuals dissolving caste and priestly hierarchy—did not occur. The structural dependence remained. The monism was internal, not communal.

3. Philosophical coherence: Scholars debate whether Śaṅkara’s system is coherent: the doctrine of māyā, of mithyā, of two truths (vyāvahārika, paramārthika). Some see paradoxes: if the world is ultimately unreal, why bother about ritual? If the self is Brahman, why remain embodied? The tension of dualism/monism is real.
This tension reinforces the reading: the coherence is patched; the system holds contradictory demands (ritual + liberation) because it serves dual ends—ritual social order and metaphysical transcendence.

4. Historical context: Śaṅkara operated within a context of heterodox challenges (Buddhism, Jainism, local cults). His consolidation of Vedic-Upaniṣadic fusion may have been defensive, not purely ideological.
That is compatible with my reading: the preservation of priest-political power often emerges via ideological consolidation against external threats.

5. The lack of monist philosophy: No significant attempts were made in India to develop a coherent monist philosophy until the hybrid efforts of Radhakrishnan.

Therefore, while recognizing these counter-points, my analysis stands as a compelling critique: Śaṅkara’s monist metaphysics served to sustain a dualist social order rather than to overturn it.

Conclusion: The Unfulfilled Promise of Autonomy

In sum, this essay has sought to develop the notion of “Śaṅkara’s Deception”. Śaṅkara’s project can be read not simply as a philosophical synthesis but as an ideological structure. He took the Vedas (dualism, ritual, hierarchy) and the Upaniṣads (monism, unity, knowledge) and fused them via the doctrine of Advaita—a semantic strategy that allowed both worlds to remain operative. He privileged knowledge over action, inward realisation over outward autonomy, and preserved the priest-politician role within the system.

The effect was to maintain India in a state of ritual dependency and social infancy: the culture was told “You are Brahman” (know yourself) but not “You are Brahman in your social being” (be yourself). The jīvanmukta remains an elite exception. The caste–ritual order remains intact. The monist horizon is internalised and individualised, not socialised and transformative.

Ultimately, the question remains: could a genuine monist social ethic—one of equivalence, autonomy, without priestly mediation—have emerged if Śaṅkara had chosen to translate his metaphysics into collective transformation? The druid Finn’s view is yes—and that his withholding of this option represents the deception. The priest-politician emerges triumphant: preserving ritual order while granting metaphysical transcendence.

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