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Spinoza’s Substance Definitions and their Weakness vs.
Finn’s Critique and Procedure Counter-Definitions By Bodhangkur I. Introduction: The Geometrical Ideal and the Problem
of Reference Baruch
Spinoza’s Ethica ordine
geometrico demonstrata
begins, famously, not with a cosmology but with a geometry. His project
mirrors Euclid: axioms, definitions, and propositions that together build a
deductive metaphysics. Yet, as the druid Finn observes from within his Procedure Monism
context, this architecture, though rigorous in form, fails in substance.
It describes, in fact merely suggests, the syntax of being, not its operation. Spinoza’s
initial definitions — substance, attribute, mode — are
the supposed cornerstones, indeed assumptions, of his system. But they are
not definitions in the Aristotelian sense: they specify no referents, offer
no instances, and identify no empirically or logically isolable entity. They
are circumscriptions: negative delimitations that describe what a
thing is not, rather than what it is. Spinoza builds a perfect
formal edifice around what is effectively a linguistic void. Finn’s
critique begins here. Where Spinoza says “Substance
is that which is in itself and conceived through itself,” Finn replies: that
is not a definition but a tautology of independence. Spinoza defines
independence by the concept of independence. His ethics, therefore, rests on
an empty absolute. Finn’s Procedure Monism supplies what Spinoza’s
geometrical method could not: a referential mechanism for what “being in
itself” actually does. II. Spinoza’s Definitions and Their Logical Status 1. Substance Per substantiam intelligo id quod
in se est et per se concipitur. Substance,
says Spinoza, exists in itself and is conceived
through itself. Its concept requires no other. This is a masterpiece of
verbal symmetry, but it defines no object. It is an epistemic condition of
conceivability, not an ontological identification. The formula merely says: something
that doesn’t depend on something else. It is like defining “the absolute”
as “that which is absolutely absolute.” A logical
definition must state both genus (the general category) and differentia
(the distinguishing feature). Spinoza’s definition has neither. The genus
“thing” is suppressed, and the differentia “in itself” merely negates
relation. Hence, the definition functions as a limit-concept — a boundary
condition in thought, not a discovery in being. 2. Attribute Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit,
tanquam ejusdem essentiam
constituens. Here,
Spinoza introduces an epistemic subject: intellectus.
An attribute is what the intellect perceives as constituting
substance’s essence. Thus, the definition relocates “attribute” from ontology
to cognition. It depends on perception, not existence. But since the
perceiver is a mode of substance (as Spinoza later asserts), the
definition becomes circular: a mode perceives substance, which is defined as
that of which modes are affections. 3. Mode Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur. A mode is
“in another” and “conceived through another.” This too is relational and
negative: a mode is not defined by its own content but by its dependence on
something else. But since the “something else” (substance) has not been
positively defined, “mode” depends on a conceptual fiction. 4. Consequence: Non-referentiality Spinoza’s
definitions refer to nothing concrete — not even to God, whose existence is
derived afterwards as the only possible “substance.” They are non-referential
because they lack demonstrable instantiation. They are, as Finn remarks,
“linguistic shadows cast by a presumed light.” The logical architecture of
the Ethics is thus built around an undefined centre, a geometrical
void whose coherence is purely formal. III. Finn’s Critique: Substance as Procedure Finn’s
criticism begins where Spinoza’s logic stalls. If substance is “that
which is in itself,” what does that do? How does “in-itselfness” manifest as a world? Finn’s Procedure
Monism answers: the Universal “Substance” is not a thing but a
rule-set — a procedure (of constraints) that organizes random
quanta into coherent interactions. Substance is not a static being,
but a doing: an iterative process of quantised emergence that gives
rise to identifiable events, each bounded and discontinuous, each “real”
because it forms a complete contact cycle. From this
perspective, Spinoza’s “substance” is a reification of what is better
understood as a universal algorithm — what Finn calls the Universal
Procedure (UP). Spinoza’s God sive Natura
is thus demoted to a rule-system: the abstract constraint architecture
within which emergent realness occurs. IV. Finn’s Counter-Definitions Let me
now restate Spinoza’s triad through Finn’s procedural ontology.
Under
this reinterpretation, “Substance–Attribute–Mode” becomes “Procedure–Constraint–Emergent.”
The structure remains monist — only one procedure operates — but it gains operational
realism. Each term corresponds to something identifiable, measurable, and
dynamic. V. Illustrative Example: Light as Procedural Substance Consider
a photon. In Spinoza’s language, the photon is a mode — an affection
of the one Substance. But in Finn’s language, the photon is a local
iteration of the Universal Procedure, manifesting under the constraints
we call the electromagnetic field. ·
The procedure is the universal law of
energy exchange (e.g. quantized interaction of fields). ·
The constraint (attribute) is
electromagnetism, one channel of manifestation. ·
The emergent (mode) is the photon event
itself — a self-identical contact that both constitutes and resolves a local
reality. Thus,
where Spinoza’s “mode” is an abstract dependence, Finn’s “emergent” is an
identifiable process: a discrete identifiable realness quantum. The Universal
Procedure does not “exist in itself” as an opaque entity; it exists through
its actual iterations. The absolute is not a background but an ongoing
rule that generates all possible foregrounds. VI. Ethical Consequence: From Geometry to Function Because
Spinoza’s definitions are non-referential, his Ethics becomes a formal
meditation on necessity without a grounding mechanism. The human “striving” (conatus)
is explained through abstract logical necessity — the derivative movement of
an undefined essence. In Finn’s
procedural framework, however, ethics becomes functional. Every emergent
strives to maintain contact (hence coherence) within its context. Virtue
(indeed ethic) is the successful iteration of the Universal Procedure within
one’s local domain. The “good” is that which sustains coherence; the “bad”
is, as lack of “good”, that which dissipates it. The geometrical form of
Spinoza’s system is retained, but its content becomes operational — a physics
of moral behaviour, not a metaphysics of moral absolutes. VII. Philosophical Implications: From Substance to
Process Spinoza’s
metaphysics remains static: substance does not change; modes are
expressions of eternal necessity. Finn’s is dynamic: procedure is
change itself — the pulse of interaction that gives birth to identity.
Spinoza’s system freezes being in logical eternity; Finn’s releases it into
procedural real-time, where identity and realness are continually
re-negotiated. Spinoza’s
monism is substantive — one infinite thing. Finn’s monism is procedural
— one ongoing rule. Spinoza’s “God” is;
Finn’s “God” does. VIII. Conclusion: From Abstract Circumscriptions to
Procedural Realism Spinoza’s
“definitions” stand as formal circumscriptions: precise in grammar, empty in
reference. They define relations of thought, not structures of existence. His
“substance” is a empty
metaphysical placeholder; his “attributes” are cognitive labels; his “modes”
are consequences of a definition, not of a process. Finn’s
Procedure Monism repairs the failure by grounding these abstractions in interactional
logic: ·
Substance = the universal rule set generating
events. ·
Attribute = the operational channel of
identification. ·
Mode = the local emergent as identifiable
reality. Where
Spinoza’s geometry defines the map of necessity, Finn’s procedure supplies
the engine of becoming. The former remains a tautology of being;
the latter, a demonstration of doing. Thus Finn’s monist solution may
be summed in his own druidic maxim: “Spinoza’s God exists in himself and needs
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