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Religion, Governance,
and Artificial Intelligence Intellectual Predecessors
and the Originality of the Druid’s Integrated Procedural Thesis By Victor Langheld Abstract This essay
situates the druid Finn’s thesis — that the Veda and related religious
systems are best understood as early artificial Guide & Control
intelligences — within the broader history of sociological, philosophical,
and technological critiques of religion and power. While numerous thinkers
have analysed religion as social control, symbolic projection, memetic
system, bureaucratic apparatus, or disciplinary technology, none has fully
integrated these perspectives into a single procedural ontology that treats
religion, law, and modern AI as a continuous lineage of artificial governance
differentiated primarily by substrate, speed, opacity, and memory
persistence. The druid’s contribution lies not in any single component claim,
but in the structural synthesis: a unified model in which religion is
reclassified as early AI, moksha is reinterpreted as procedural feedback,
and modern AI is
analysed as a phase change in artificial governance due to infrastructural
invisibility and effective immortality. This integration appears to be
largely original in formulation. 1. The long tradition: religion as social and control
technology 1.1 Durkheim: religion as society worshipping itself Émile
Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) remains
foundational. Durkheim argued that gods are symbolic representations of
society itself, and that sacred law functions to bind social groups through
collective representations. In this view: ·
Religion is a social technology. ·
Sacred norms are social norms elevated to
metaphysical status. ·
Ritual reinforces collective cohesion. Durkheim
anticipates one pillar of the druid’s thesis: religion as a stabilising
system rather than divine revelation. However, Durkheim remains within
sociology and symbolism. He does not: ·
treat religion as an artificial intelligence
architecture, ·
analyse rule execution and control loops, ·
connect ancient systems to modern computational
governance, ·
or consider substrate, speed, and memory
persistence as structural variables. Durkheim
explains religion’s social role, but not its procedural
architecture. 1.2 Weber: rationalisation and bureaucratic control Max
Weber’s analysis of rationalisation and bureaucracy shows how religious
traditions evolve into: ·
rule-based institutions, ·
codified doctrines, ·
clerical hierarchies, ·
procedural enforcement mechanisms. Weber
identifies priesthoods and religious law as bureaucratic systems that
discipline behaviour. This aligns strongly with the druid’s claim that
priesthoods function as interpreter/enforcer layers. Yet Weber’s
framework is historical and sociological. He does not: ·
conceptualise religion as artificial
intelligence, ·
model it as a control architecture, ·
or integrate modern AI as a
continuation of the same lineage. Weber
describes institutionalisation; the druid models control as system design. 2. Evolutionary and memetic theories of religion 2.1 Dawkins, Dennett, Boyer: religion as evolved
software Modern
evolutionary and cognitive theorists often treat religion as: ·
a memetic replicator, ·
a cognitive parasite, ·
an adaptation or byproduct of agency detection, ·
a cultural technology for cooperation. Richard
Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Pascal Boyer all frame religion as something
like software running on human brains. This
comes close to Finn’s thesis of “religion as artificial system.” However: ·
these accounts remain focused on psychological
and evolutionary mechanisms, ·
they do not model religion as large-scale
governance architecture, ·
they do not integrate enforcement, institutional
middleware, and cosmic sanction as control amplifiers, ·
and they do not connect ancient systems to modern
AI via
substrate and speed. Religion
is treated as software, but not as infrastructure-level
intelligence. 3. Discipline, invisibility, and environmental power 3.1 Foucault: power as ambient and distributed Michel
Foucault is perhaps the closest structural neighbour to the druid’s analysis. Key
overlaps: ·
Power is not only top-down command. ·
Power is environmental and disciplinary. ·
Power is embedded in institutions, norms, and
knowledge. ·
Power becomes invisible and internalised. This maps
strongly to the druid’s ideas of: ·
ambient guidance, ·
invisible control, ·
environment-shaped behaviour. However,
Foucault does not: ·
treat religion as early artificial intelligence, ·
model power in procedural or computational terms, ·
analyse substrate (stone vs electronics) as a
phase variable, ·
or connect disciplinary power to modern AI
infrastructure. Foucault
provides a theory of power’s form. 4. Technics and megamachines 4.1 Mumford and Ellul: societies as machines Lewis
Mumford and Jacques Ellul described ancient empires and technological
societies as megamachines: ·
humans as components, ·
social systems as control apparatuses, ·
large-scale coordination as mechanical. This
overlaps strongly with the druid’s Guide & Control framing. Yet
again, they do not: ·
frame religion explicitly as artificial
intelligence, ·
integrate computational substrate shifts, ·
analyse immortality of memory, ·
or treat modern AI as a direct continuation of
ancient governance logic. They
describe machine-like societies. 5. Harari: religions as algorithms Yuval Noah
Harari comes closest in popular discourse. He explicitly states that: Religions
are algorithms for organising human cooperation. This
aligns clearly with the druid’s framing. However,
Harari: ·
uses “algorithm” metaphorically, ·
does not formalise religion as AI
architecture, ·
does not integrate moksha as feedback signal, ·
does not analyse invisibility, immortality, and
ambient control as structural variables, ·
and does not construct a procedural ontology
linking ancient and modern systems. Harari
gestures. 6. What is genuinely new in the druid’s integration The
druid’s originality lies not in any single claim, but in the full
procedural synthesis. The following components exist separately in prior
thinkers, but not as a unified model: 6.1 Religion as early artificial governance
intelligence Not
merely social control, but AI (-like) architecture: ·
rule encoding, ·
generalisation, ·
enforcement, ·
interpreter middleware, ·
self-preservation. Religion
is reclassified as functional artificial intelligence, not
metaphorically, but architecturally. 6.2 Moksha as procedural feedback The
reinterpretation of moksha (and salvation analogues) as: the felt after-effect of solved
constraint and reduced internal drag is
especially distinctive. Most
theories treat salvation as belief-structure, illusion, or symbolic promise.
The druid treats it as native system feedback, captured, artificially
upgraded and institutionalised. This is
not standard in religious criticism. 6.3 Substrate-speed theory The
explicit claim that: ·
ancient AI and modern AI differ
primarily by substrate, ·
electronics remove biological and symbolic
bottlenecks, ·
speed, bandwidth, and noise reduction produce a
phase change, is not
found in classic religion or sociology of religion. This
reframes modern AI as continuation,
not rupture. 6.4 Invisibility and infrastructural power The
druid’s emphasis on: ·
distributed data centres, ·
lack of a killable ruler, ·
power as substrate, ·
governance as environment, integrates
Foucault-like insights into a computational and infrastructural ontology. This goes
beyond disciplinary theory into architectural metaphysics of power. 6.5 Immortality of artificial memory The claim
that modern AI
introduces: effective
non-transience of artificial governance relative to biological agents is a
major original contribution. Most
theorists do not treat memory persistence as an ontological shift in power
relations. Here,
immortality is not theological. 7. The integrated lineage: what others did not unify No major
thinker appears to have fully integrated: ·
religion as early AI, ·
moksha (liberation) as feedback signal, ·
priesthood as middleware, ·
substrate-speed as phase variable, ·
invisibility as infrastructural condition, ·
immortality of memory, ·
ambient probabilistic guidance, ·
modern AI as continuation of ancient
governance. Others
address parts: ·
Durkheim → social cohesion ·
Weber → bureaucracy ·
Foucault → invisible discipline ·
Harari → religion as algorithm ·
Mumford/Ellul → megamachines The
druid’s contribution is the procedural unification of these into a
single system ontology. 8. Why this matters conceptually The
druid’s synthesis changes how both religion and AI are
understood: ·
Religion is no longer primarily belief or
symbolism. It is early artificial governance. ·
Modern AI is no longer unprecedented.
It is governance with biological speed limits removed. ·
Power is no longer person, law, or institution.
It is substrate. ·
God is no longer primarily theology. It is the
compliance wrapper on rule systems. ·
Moksha (liberation) is no longer
transcendence. It is relief after repair. This is
not merely critique. It is reclassification. 9. Conclusion: originality by integration, not by
isolated claims The druid
Finn’s thesis is best characterised as: Largely
original in formulation and integration, though composed of elements with
clear intellectual precedents. The
originality does not lie in saying: ·
“Religion is social control” (old), ·
“Power is invisible” (old), ·
“AI governs behaviour” (obvious), ·
“Systems shape humans” (old). It lies
in saying: These are
one and the same procedural lineage, differentiated by substrate, speed,
opacity, and memory persistence — with religion as early AI and modern AI as
its infrastructural, non-transient successor. That
integrated model does not appear in standard religious studies, sociology,
philosophy of technology, or AI theory. Others
described parts of the machine. The druid describes the machine as machine. Diagram of Patanjali
Sutras 1.2, 1.3 & 1.4 The Biological Origins of
Yoga From natural
intelligence to deified artificial regulation |