Observations & critiques

on Part 1 of The 3 Characteristics Sutta

 

 

  1. The sutta has no title. It has been retrieved from the Mahavagga section of the Vinaya. Whether or not the Vinaya accurately repeats, or each section accurately repeat the original dhamma of the Tathagata is unknown. It is generally assumed that the Vinaya is older than the sutta baskets. The assumption if probably erroneous.
  2. The style of the 1st part of the sutta, the anatta proposition, differs from the style of the 2nd part, the annicca and dukkha parts. This indicates that the parts appear to have been generated at different stages of development (i.e. of the formal elaboration) of the Tathataga’s dhamma, or by different sects. The 1st part is an apodictic statement, i.e. ‘That’s the way it is!’.  The 2nd part uses the ‘leading’ question and answer format.
  3. The first part of the sutta is incomplete. The direct consequence of anatta, namely dukkha (a fuzz word with multiple meaning, such as stress, trouble, unpleasantness, pain, sorrow and so on) , is not attached. Nor are the consequences of the realization of the direct consequence of annata, i.e. dukkha, attached, namely the necessary detachment from (or release from craving for) that which is anatta.
  4. The proposition of the 1st part of the sutta is fundamentally redundant. The anatta proposition is implied in the 2nd, namely the annica part (and which appears to have been the original ‘origin of dukkha’ proposition). In short, ‘since nothing lasts, no thing can be called one’s own because it has no permanent own quality or essence, or nature). Consequently, Part 1 functions as a frills and whistle, i.e. packaging of part 2, and which is a weak and shoddy packaging for the true message, namely, ‘All that is subject to arising is subject to cessation’ (hence an emerging phenomenon) elaboration.

 

The an’atta proposition

 

  1. In his 40 years of wandering, the Tathagata never once defined the precise meaning of atta. The term is possibly derived from Sanskrit: âtma, possibly a compression of Sanskrit: tattva or sattva). All attempts to produce a universally accepted definition (hence meaning) of atta have failed. Why the Tathagata did not - or decided, for tactical reasons not to – produce an unequivocal explanation of this key term is not known. Perhaps the meaning of atta was so obvious to his hearers that defining it was found to be unnecessary.
  2. The introduction of the 5 (rather than 2, 3 or n) khandas is superfluous. Deconstruction of an emerging phenomenon into the sub-functions (or parts, i.e. sankharas), the latter also presenting as whole phenomena capable of being sub-divided), a tactic frequently used by the Tathagata, appears to serve the need to elaborate and reinforce the understanding for those of low intelligence (i.e. oafs) or little perspective (i.e. naifs), or simply to distract. The argument could have been put more simply, therefore efficiently, if the notion of sankhara (possibly meaning: cluster, mass, formation, impression, affect and so on and which appears to (i.e. affect) an observer as a whole unit or quantum (therefore giving the observer the impression that a whole unit, namely a ‘true self’ was experiencing the whole affect), hence of a (indeed) any) phenomenon undergoing arising and ceasing had been used (note: the fuzz word sankhara is introduced as the 4th khanda, and which causes a lot of confusion).
  3. Since the Tathagata did not explain the meaning of atta, rather than describe 1 consequence (of who knows how many other consequences), his claim that all phenomena are anatta is fundamentally spurious. In other words, claiming a phenomenon is not atta whilst not defining atta leaves the hearer completely in the dark (to wit, in uncertainty), i.e. with nothing to hold or fix on to (and which outcome was, of course, the Tathagata’s ‘expedient means’). Here the Tathagata is applying in reverse the inefficient and unprofitable means he describes in the ‘Elephant and the blind men’ simile. This hearers are blind because hat they are trying to grasp, namely atta, has no definition.
  4. The English rendering of atta first as ‘self’, then as ‘soul’ (presumably Christian, and whatever that means)  is false. The Tathagata did not state that atta meant soul (Sanskrit & Pali:  jiva). Nor is the notion of atta = soul (or self) supported, hence confirmed by the described consequences of ‘not atta’. The Tathagata remained silent on the notion of ‘soul’ and its capabilities, always reminding his hearers that metaphysical speculation was unprofitable, unwholesome and so on (Pali: akusala), in fact a dukkha inducing intoxicant (Pali: asava)(see Part 2). The notions that atta means soul and that the Tathagata preached ‘no soul’, and that Buddhism is the religion that denies the soul was invented by a mid 19th century, Anglican Christian amateur translator (i.e. T.W. Rhys Davids) who had a working knowledge of Sanskrit (and the Upanishads) but no knowledge of Pali or Singhalese.
  5. The description of the consequences of anatta, i.e. of not-atta, namely ‘Let my form become thus, let my body not become thus’, suggests that the English translation of atta would be more accurate if rendered as the adjective (or part reflexive pronoun) ‘own’ (rather than self). The fact that ‘I cannot do what I want with my form’ (and the other 4 khandas) suggests lack of ownership, hence of control. Such lack of ownership happens because the phenomenon is not original and unique (i.e. peculiar) to, hence a true (i.e. real, i.e. sattva) and permanent substance of the person experiencing it. In short, the Tathagata reasoned that because an individual (i.e. he) cannot control a phenomenon (i.e. any one of the khandas, indeed, any sankhara), it cannot be his own (indeed a fundamental, because original substance belonging to him (permanently)). The Tathagata’s conclusion is a general (i.e. sub specie aeternitatis, to wit, fully relativsed) conclusion, no doubt derived from his experience as a wandering beggar. Unfortunately, his rebirth proposition appears to contradict his anatta proposition, thus suggesting that he was putting forth a ‘Two Truths’ dhamma (see Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths).